There is a serious question to be asked about British involvement in the war in Iraq. In the heat of allegation and counter-allegation between No 10 and the BBC, it is very easy to lose sight of the big issue. Was there a robust case to support early military intervention? Tony Blair obviously believed that there was, and he was able to convince most of his cabinet colleagues. Lord Goldsmith, the attorney- general, was able to reassure Parliament and the armed forces that any action would be legal under international law. Finally, the House of Commons was given the unique opportunity to vote on the issue ahead of the operation, and a majority of Labour and Conservatives MPs ensured that the war started with the blessing of the House.
Subsequent events have shown that Iraq posed no threat either to the region or to the wider world. Against the modern military capabilities of the US, Britain and Australia, the Iraqi army crumbled in days, and neither their air force nor navy played any part in battle. Far from weapons of mass destruction being poised to repel allied forces at a moment's notice, we have been unable to trace a single nuclear, biological or chemical weapon after more than two months in control of the country. The real question should be how did the Government get its threat assessment so wrong?
Governments often get their forecasts wrong. They may believe that a large dome in Greenwich will be a winner; or that a Poll Tax would be a really neat idea. Wars should be different. The decision to go to war is the most serious decision for any democracy. It will always be difficult to make the right call. Everyone may be worse off after a war, but how do you balance short term misery against long term security? War in response to aggression, like the invasion of Kuwait or strikes against al Qaeda in Afghanistan, is sometimes an easier decision. War for humanitarian reasons, is more difficult. In Kosovo in 1999, the international community - through NATO rather than the United Nations - decided to act to prevent the highly visible ethnic cleansing. But the case for Iraq was made on different grounds. Killing Iraqi people because we believed that their government was not complying with UN resolutions was always going to be open to moral debate.
Now that we know that Iraq posed no near term threat, either from its conventional or other weapons, we need to re-examine how the British government came to make the decision to go to war. This is much more important than whether particular intelligence assessments were hyped or not. Once a policy decision is made, politicians are bound to sell it as hard as they can. In the secret world of intelligence, it is very difficult even for the informed outside observer to make critical judgements. Those of us who follow global proliferation issues, were surprised by the excitement over Iraq. Most academics and unclassified intelligence assessments had been reporting little threat from weapons of mass destruction or long range missiles in Iraq over the past few years.
Three reports were published in the UK which seemed to be trying to make the case for a longer term threat. The International Institute for Strategic Studies produced a compilation from unclassified sources in September last year. The government dossier of the following month was broadly similar, but made the implications of possible future Iraqi missile and weapon developments rather starker. The third "dodgy dossier" has already been effectively disowned by Jack Straw. Interesting as the political posturing is over these public documents, such debate does not get to the key question of why the rush to war?
Government needs to understand how it came to take the country to war without exhausting the diplomatic routes available. Neither of the two parliamentary committees investigating will be able to answer this question satisfactorily. Even Margaret Thatcher was prepared to have an independent inquiry into her Falklands adventure. Tony Blair owes the country as much for his more iffy war in Iraq. Perhaps it is time for Parliament to insist that there is an automatic requirement for such a commission after all combat operations by British forces.
Sir Tim Garden is a former air marshal, and is now visiting professor at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London.
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